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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GARRY S. DUPONT,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20010952-CA

:
ARGUMENT

ISSUE: THE CONVICTION FOR INTERFERING WITH AN ARREST
FAILS FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
A. Dupont Properly Marshaled the Evidence in Challenging the
Sufficiency of the Evidence on Appeal.
The State asserts in its brief ("S.B.") that Appellant Garry S. Dupont ("Dupont")
ignored two facts in contravention of his marshaling requirement on appeal. S.B. 17.
The State does not, however, suggest that his appeal should be affirmed for lack of
marshaling. S.B. Point I.C; see, e.g., Campbell v. Box Elder Ctv. 962 P.2d 806, 808
(Utah App. 1998) (appellant's challenge to factual finding will be rejected for failure to
marshal evidence; appellate court assumes evidence supports factual findings in such
instances). As discussed below, such a position would be unfounded in this case since
Dupont in fact fulfilled the marshaling requirement. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,
^14, 989 P.2d 1065 (citation omitted) (requiring appellant to fully marshal evidence in
light favorable to conviction prior to demonstrating insufficiency of evidence on appeal).
Under Utah case law concerning the marshaling requirement, Dupont clearly

satisfied his burden on appeal. For example, in Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, 51
P.3d 724, this Court ruled that the appellant did not meet her marshaling requirement
because she merely "reargu[ed] the evidence presented at trial that was favorable to her
position." Id at ^[12. In Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and
Prof 1 Licensing, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991), this Court similarly held that the
appellant did not meet his marshaling requirement where he "reviewed in minute detail
all the evidence before the Nursing Board," rather than culling out the evidence that
supported its findings. LI at 464; see also West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818
P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that appellant did not meet marshaling
requirement where he only presented a "general catalogue of evidence" rather than facts
that "correlate[d]" challenged findings).
Unlike the appellants in Neelv, Heinecke, or Majestic, Dupont did not merely
reargue his position in marshaling the evidence, nor did he catalogue every speck of
evidence presented at trial, leaving it to this Court to discern which facts supported the
jury's verdict. Rather, he assiduously noted the points of evidence that supported the
verdict, even the damaging facts. See Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 9-10. He marshaled
evidence that Officer Wyant gave him the opportunity to take the shaving kit before the
search, but that he declined to take the kit. A.B.9; R.286[91,94,130]. He also marshaled
evidence that he repeatedly said, "give me my shaving bag, give me my shaving bag,"
once it was discovered by Wyant. A.B.9; R.286[94]. He also noted that Wyant testified

2

he fled the scene and contim

, . . . A\± IUIU to stop and even after the
1l

officers gave chase. A.B. 10; R.286[95-96j

'

marshaled evidence that he

i,""h approximately 30 feet before being apprehended, as well as r*

. •. o.ianle

statements that he made to the police, including "I give up, I give up" and ^ -^ ' '
catch the big fish." A l l 10; l?„1"7«C)| (*f>, 11' ', i • i, i i -1 i inally, Dupont noted that he was
observed at a known drug house and win

_: u L. ... A prior to the stop,

114,116]. In short, Duponi appropriate11 -

.. .presenting •

'

„u\ocatc in

. -. u L ice supporting the |ur\ 's verdict. Neely, 2002 I IT , \pp
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uon that. •, , i»d not marshal evidence is

without merit. S.B.PointLC.
Moreover, the particular evidence that the State claim I h,poiti ignored is enher
exceed!1

\

A\ iia record or does not support the J**;'} a vudiet

of the marshaling *v-\ . • •

s

. ^,u- po^iis that Officer Wyunt testified during

cror ^-examination and on redirect tha:

Knighton to detain Dupont, in

uliJui-nii in motioning to him lodu so. S.Ii.17 n.6; R.286*

ta

.. .

did in IVI »i(<;c \\\ , iv,nd i-^l.l" «n his testimony, R.286[I vl.l42J, the meanii ..
word is quite unclear whe^

: .n^re thorough explanation of the event

-.u* -ng direct examination, which was conduced h\ I|K; \\ ^seiui- w I'here, the
ccuior asked:
What Ciu - ; u
. Wyant* V ^ »* '

• it

v

™] saw these things fin the shaving kit]?
1
I remained in the \ chicle unci motioned out to
3

Deputy Knighton to detain Mr. Dupont at that point in time.
Prosecutor: Did you tell Deputy Knighton why you wanted him to detain
the defendant?
Wyant: No, I did not.
R.286[95].
When Wyant later testifies that he "told" Knighton to detain Dupont, it is in a
much more cursory explanation of the events, and neither the prosecutor nor defense
counsel is focused on the manner in which he "told" Knighton (i.e. - by motion or actual
words). For example, the defense's cross-examination focused on what Dupont knew
about whether he was free to leave; it was not an exploration of Wyant's semantics.
R.286[133]. Likewise, the prosecutor's redirect examination of Wyant was focused on
the time line of events, and not necessarily on how Wyant "told" Knighton to detain
Dupont. R.286[ 142]. There is no attempt at clarification of this point. Id
Consequently, Wyant's use of the word "told" is exceedingly vague in the record.
R286[133,142]. It is much more clear, however, that he "motioned" to Knighton.
R.286[95].
The marshaling requirement requires that the appellant refrain from providing a
"general catalogue"of evidence presented at trial and burdening this Court with the task
of sifting through it to gauge which facts support the jury's verdict. Majestic, 818 P.2d at
1315; see also Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 464. In light of the substantial ambiguity of the
evidence and the lack of clarification of Wyant's use of the word "told," inclusion of that
evidence among the marshaled facts would have amounted to the sort of meaningless
4
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interfere with an arrest.
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Moreover, like ih«' o itlenee about whether Wyant "told" K nighton to detain
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, ambient*

tatement. Contrary to the State's
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if \)\\y MI«

said those words at all. R.286[132]. Even when his recollection was refreshed by the
prosecutor using Deputy Knighton's report, Wyant denied hearing the statement, saying:
[The report] says that I continue to process the vehicle. I don't recall Garry
saying anything about those items. He may have to Deputy Knighton.
Prosecutor: Okay. You just didn't hear him.
Wyant: No. I didn't hear him.
R.286[133].
Consequently, there is substantial ambiguity surrounding Dupont's statement.
Indeed, it is not even clear that the statement was made at all. To the extent that an
appellant's marshaling duty is designed to provide this Court with the facts supporting
the jury's verdict, and not a "general catalogue" of any and all evidence presented at trial,
Dupont appropriately marshaled the evidence in his opening brief to include only the
facts that "correlate^]" the jury's guilty verdict. Majestic, 818 P.2d at 1315.
B. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Challenge the Sufficiency
of the Evidence Underlying the Charge of Resisting Arrest.
The State contends that Dupont is arguing that defense counsel was per se
ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence insofar as he relies on
State v. Hoteate. 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346. S.B.12. Contra ry to the State's assertion,
Dupont duly recognizes that under the current law governing ineffective assistance
claims an attorney's tactical decision to not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence may
not fall below a reasonable standard of professional care in certain circumstances.
A.B.16 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984); Taylor v.

6

Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)). Accordingly, Dupont recognizes that
Hoi gate's holding is limited to the rule that "a defendant must raise [a challenge to] the
sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for
appeal." 2000 UT 74 at f 16. It does not set forth a rule that states failure to do so is
ineffective per se where the decision to not make a sufficiency challenge is tactical.
However, the present case does not present a scenario where such an omission can
be justified as tactical or, as the State alleges, on the basis that it would have been futile.
S.B.13: see State v. Kelley. 2000 UT 41, ^[26, 1 P.3d 546 (M[f]ailure to raise futile
objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel"). As noted in Dupont1 s
opening brief, there is no tactical reason for not challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence since such motion can readily and quickly be raised before the court and outside
the presence of the jury. A.B.I 6. Moreover, such challenges are fairly routine and do
not take a lot of research or preparation beyond familiarizing one's self with the particular
facts of the defendant's case and the statutory offense at issue, in this case interfering
with arrest. See Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305 (1999).
In addition, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in this case cannot
reasonably be viewed as futile considering the ambiguity of the evidence against Dupont.
As discussed at length in his opening brief, there is considerable evidence that he was
unaware of the drugs found in his shaving kit and that he thought he was free to go when
he left the scene. A.B. Point LA. Moreover, there was very little evidence beyond his

7

mere presence connecting him to the drug house or the activity of Lund, the known drug
suspect who was originally under investigation in this case. IJL Indeed, the paucity of
evidence in this case compelled the jury to acquit Dupont of the two felony possession
offenses that he was charged with. R.255; see. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
2000).
Considering the weak evidence against Dupont and the juryfs willingness to acquit
on all the drug charges, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for the remaining
interfering charge is a reasonable strategy in this case. A reasonable professional in
defense counsel's position would have recognized the willingness of the jury to acquit,
and consequently would have appealed to the judge in a final effort to plead his client's
innocence. The judge may have shared in the jury's willingness to acquit. Coupled with
a judge's superior knowledge of the legal aspects of the argument, a reasonable defense
attorney would have at least made the argument. Indeed, it is the role of the defense
attorney to advocate all reasonable stances at trial, including the innocence of the
defendant of a particular charge. Accordingly, defense counsel's failure to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence cannot be justified as tactical and, therefore, within the
bounds of reasonable professional advocacy. See. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-94; Taylor,
905P.2dat282.1

1

Dupont submits on his opening brief in response to any arguments raised by the
State that are not expressly addressed herein.
8

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing and based on the arguments set forth in his opening brief,
Dupont respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for interfering with
arrest for lack of sufficient evidence supporting the verdict. Alternatively, Dupont
requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand to the trial court on the basis of
the prejudicial submission of the flight instruction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this f^day of September, 2002.
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CATHERINE E. LILLY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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